1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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lots. However, the farmers of the water head area still refused to take part, and the Water Conservation Bureau and the police who had been requested to intervene then told the farmers to mediate the dispute themselves.

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Dependence upon mediation as a primary solution to all disputes seems to be as common in rural Taiwan today as it has traditionally been. The reason for this is that rural people usually do not wish to become involved with the authorities and so seek to mediate most problems among themselves. The person who immediately takes a dispute to the authorities is considered unreasonable. If the problem is recognized as being severe, and it does become necessary to take it to the authorities, too often they—including the police, courts, and local civil officials—do not wish to become involved in local problems. Involvement costs them time and trouble and may mean making enemies. Therefore, wherever it is at all possible, the authorities insist that the disputants mediate their own problem.

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However, in the mediation of disputes, one of the disputants not uncommonly has an advantage, simply because he is more powerful, that is, has more prestige, money, and influence. Although the idea of reasonableness of disputants' demands is inherent in the concept of mediation, such a powerful disputant is not likely to be particularly reasonable in his demands for settlement.

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This was the case in the above mentioned irrigation problem. Obviously, in order to change the rotation order successfully, all farmers concerned had to be in unanimous agreement. However, the farmers in the water tail area could do little to force the issue, since the farmers in the water head area had nothing to gain by cooperation. Finally, as the situation became critical, the pumps were put into operation by the small water unit chief and his assistants in order to try to save the rice crops. The allocation of the excess expenses for operating the pumps was left for a later decision.

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While for the most part the public irrigation system runs smoothly as long as there is enough water, there are occasions where a lack of cooperation upsets the operation of the system and the fair distribution of water to all. There have been a few occasions when several men from a large village in the water head area opened the dam on the river so that little water flowed into the canal and down to the water tail. They did it simply to make it easier to catch fish. This demonstration of complete lack of social responsibility toward their fellows was condemned by all the villagers whose fields were affected by the cutoff of the water supply. However, the villagers of the water head area, who were not affected, did not actively censure their fellows even though they did not condone the act. The apparent lack of concern for the welfare of people of another area is not unusual. In this case the

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

312 474 servation Bureau and Association and can therefore exert a great deal of influence if any problems should arise in dealing with these agencies.

[653] The farmers who receive water from private irrigation systems must also be members of the area Water Conservation Association, and therefore pay for the use of the water which is considered public. Water is usually distributed among members of the pumping station cooperatives on the basis of rotation, the order of which is determined by drawing lots. The land of some farmers served by the pumping station was formerly nonirrigated, so these men had to dig their own irrigation ditches. However, some members of the cooperative also cultivate paddy land which is in the water tail area of the public irrigation system. In these cases, when the farmers joined the cooperative, the public irrigation ditches were frequently used to carry the privately pumped water to their land, usually at times when there was no public irrigation water coming through the ditch. The use of these 312 474 public irrigation ditches for the water pumped by the cooperative is 578 sometimes responsible for disputes and even violence, as will be seen in the case of a Hsin Hsing farmer who was not a member of the large cooperative. Li Fan took water for his field from the public ditch. Two members of the cooperative accused him of stealing the cooperative's water, claiming that there was little public water coming through at the time, and beat him severely. This incident caused controversy and antagonism between Hsin Hsing and Ta Yu, the village in which most of the members of the cooperative lived. When mediation yielded no [627] solution to the conflict, the villagers finally resorted to the courts. [692] (This case is described in detail in Chapter 6.)

241 312 474 433 The building of these pumping station cooperatives has greatly increased agricultural production for the lands they serve. Much of the land they irrigate was formerly dry land producing only such crops as sweet potatoes, special broom grasses, cucumbers, and peanuts. Today, these same lands are good rice producers. In addition, the lands benefiting from the private irrigation systems can usually receive water earlier than the surrounding water tail land which gets water from the public irrigation system. Consequently, while the water tail land frequently receives too little water too late, the land privately irrigated by the pumping stations usually receives ample water much earlier. This means that farmers benefiting from the private irrigation systems rarely have any difficulty in planting and harvesting according to the dates specified by the agricultural calendar.

312 571 628 Thus, the expansion of the irrigation network, both public and private, has required villagers to involve themselves with people and government in places where they previously had few, if any, relations. Irrigation networks cross village and even area boundaries. Although

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ants." The Hsin Hsing villagers readily recall that the local Japanese police and officials showed respect only for the well-to-do landlords. Consequently, if the villagers were to get along successfully with the Japanese, they had to work through their landlords. They usually elected a landlord to handle local village affairs and to represent village interests in dealing with the Japanese authorities.

The arrangement was also to the landlord's advantage. As the official leader, he wielded greater power by which he could more easily manipulate the villagers, and even the tax collector, to his own advantage. His recognition as a leader by his fellow villagers and by the authorities also increased his prestige.

Not only was such a landlord the elected village political leader but he might often be an informal leader as well, a person who took an active part in most of the social and religious affairs of the village. He usually contributed money and time to help make these affairs a success. The efforts of the landlord helped to build up his reputation as a public-spirited citizen. Frequently, he assumed the role of mediator in discussions of village and intervillage problems and in disputes between his own villagers or even between members of other villages. When the landlord's efforts as a mediator extended beyond his own village, he enhanced his own reputation in the whole area and that of his village as well.

These conditions continued after the restoration into the post-land reform period. Today, the landlord class continues in the rural area and wields power in local grass roots politics as well as in socioeconomic affairs. In most villages the recognized leaders are still those who are rich, maintain big landholdings, and have had a fairly good education. Such people may also have influence—perhaps by virtue of a relative—in some government agency. It is still a great advantage to a village to have a wealthy representative of the landlord class to deal successfully with authorities. Many, if not most of the government officials, are drawn from this class, since they are educated and usually wealthy.

However, this picture is beginning to change. Village affairs are being profoundly affected as many former large landlords and traditional local leaders transfer their economic interests and activities away from the land to new business interests elsewhere. When a landlord gives up his major economic interests in the area, it is usually not long before village social, religious, and political activities become much less important to him. Because the personal advantage is gone, he is no longer concerned with maintaining his status or leadership role. He may even move his residence out of the village in order to be closer to his new economic interests.

Villages suffering such a loss of local leadership have reacted in two

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

618 That Hsin Hsing *tsu* are more than merely ceremonial is seen in the way various individual unrelated families, because they share a common surname with a *tsu*, try to identify with it and, to a small degree, do absorb some of the hoped for and actual sociopolitical benefits and security which seem to accrue to members of the larger village *tsu* organizations. (This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.)

618 Each village *tsu* can therefore be seen as attempting to exert socio-
• 627 political influence in the village and sometimes also in the immediate area in competition with other *tsu*. So as not to weaken its position in face of the rest of the village, each *tsu* works hard to confine its internal conflicts within the *tsu* itself. Therefore, their own respected (and usually well-off) elders serve as mediators for the solution of intra-*tsu* conflict. In case of inter-*tsu*, general village, or intervillage conflict, these some *tsu* leaders have usually been recognized by the villagers as the most likely people to be able to bring a conflict to a successful solution.

618 As we have seen above and will see more of here and in Chapter 6, the Hsin Hsing village area kinship organizations, despite their relatively small size and minimum formalization, nevertheless do display a relative functional equivalence to Hu's (1948) and Freedman's (1958) images of a *tsu* and thus are clearly to be considered as *tsu* organizations, as they are by their members. One might further note that for the *tsu* organizations in Hsin Hsing village, there appears to be no inherent relationship between structure and function. The most important feature of such groupings is that their activities (such as their sociopolitical ones) be carried out within the local community and perhaps the larger area, and these seem to be carried through here with a minimum of formal structure. Since *tsu* is not to be thought of as a static organizational phenomenon but rather as having a kind of evolution with stages going from incipience through decay, a *tsu* in its early or incipient stages of development could then exist on a very small scale, be rather weak in its formal organization and activities and even in its functional effectiveness, and yet still maintain itself as a *tsu*.

178 What is also worth noting (and what we will see more of in Chapter
618 6), is that conditions in the Taiwanese rural area have been working against the likelihood of these unelaborated *tsu* ever developing into truly mature *tsu*. This seems to be true in the case of the adverse effect
[648 on the rural *tsu* organizations by the Japanese during their period of
423] occupation of Taiwan and the recently changing socioeconomic conditions, such as the Land Reform Program, which prohibit the *tsu* from acquiring corporate landholdings and inhibit *tsu* members from achieving great landed wealth within the rural area. In addition, it also appears that as a result of these past and recent developments the

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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guest. He is usually served with whatever delicacies are available and treated in an extremely warm and cordial manner. (When one visits a *ch'in tsu*, even when he is not busy, one cannot expect to be served any refreshments or be treated in any special way.) In speaking of visits to *ch'in ch'i* or of their general relations with them as compared with their *ch'in tsu*, most villagers describe them as being much warmer.

However, as is true of the *ch'in tsu* relationship, there are situations in which conflict does exist between *ch'in ch'i*. There can be conflicts over the exchange of wedding gifts and dowry or tension over the poor adaptation of the daughter-in-law to the new family. Certainly *ch'in ch'i* relationships are not totally without bad feelings, but great care is taken to minimize conflict.

It is because these relationships are so good that *ch'in ch'i* often play an important mediatorial rule. When ill-feeling develops between *ch'in tsu* in Hsin Hsing, the elders of the *tsu* group may be called upon to mediate and settle the dispute. A respected man of the village or the mayor may be called upon, especially by the very small kinship groups. If these means fail it is common to invite a respected *ch'in ch'i* male, who is related to both disputants, to mediate. Such a mediator is considered the person most likely to be able to settle the dispute successfully. Although related to both, this *ch'in ch'i* is somewhat less familiar and greatly respected. If for no other reason than his "face" or his reputation in the eyes of others, his *ch'in ch'i* usually settle their dispute peacefully. The villagers generally feel, then, that disputes between members of the same *tsu* are best mediated by highly respected *ch'in ch'i*.

Politically, the *ch'in ch'i* activities have unquestionable importance during elections beyond the village level. Since the restoration of the present Chinese government in Taiwan, elections of one sort or another have become important annual events in the area. Whether the election is only on the *hsiang* level or as high as the *hsien* level, great interest is built up in the village. Often, several people from the local area or village run in county and district elections. An individual candidate in either, living in a village or nearby market town, must depend upon votes from the entire area in order to win the election. This, then, necessitates a large circle of campaign managers—people spread through the area who will campaign for the candidate among their fellow villagers and their own relatives. For this purpose, one's *ch'in ch'i* are often the most important single source of political support.

Ch'in ch'i are generally spread over the local countryside as a result of the marriage and adoption patterns. Large family groups, which are often the ones most likely to produce a candidate for a political office, are usually noted for the large number of their *ch'in ch'i* extensions. This tends to give added advantage to their candidates. The candidate

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

example bolster the declining role of the village as a source of security and identification. Considering their potential, such men contribute relatively little to their villages.

Coupled with this has been the more recent decline of the traditional landlord leadership as an effect of the Land Reform Program and an ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership which has developed in the village. When leadership was sorely needed, as in the Li Fan case for example, the villagers actually turned to me, the alien anthropologist, as a potential source of leadership and help. Many former leaders, now prefer not to become too involved in other people's problems or those of the village. In fact, it is now often difficult for villages to find qualified and respected men even to run for the office of mayor or to assume the responsibilities of a leadership role.

The ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership affects not only the operation of the village but that of the *tsu* organizations. One important area of village life adversely affected by the lack of leadership is the apparently increasing inability to resolve local conflict by the traditional method of mediation which was usually carried on by respected *tsu*, village, or area leaders. A particular mediator was selected according to the relationship of the disputants and the nature of the conflict, which might involve intravillage or intervillage disputes over water for irrigation; disputes over landownership and property boundaries; or power struggles between families, especially between *tsu* organizations, over such questions as village administration or the expenditure of funds by village or *tsu* for religious or festive activities; and so on.

Almost always, regardless of the nature of the dispute or the level on which it occurred, mediation had been sought and applied with these aims: first, that the scope and resolution of the conflict be kept localized so as not to invite possible government interference into village affairs, and, second, that the resolution permit the diputants to continue to live harmoniously together. Villagers felt a great degree of permanency since most, tied as they were to the land and to their village, were likewise tied by the particular kinds of relationships developed over the years with local people, both kin and non-kin. There were few opportunities to leave the area, land, or kinship group and go elsewhere so as to avoid the repercussions of an ill-settled dispute.

In recent years, however, it has been becoming increasingly difficult to resolve conflict through mediation and to achieve these aims. In part this is a result of the deterioration of the accepted hierarchal relationship system on both the kin and non-kin levels. On the non-kin level the concept or code of *han-ch'ing* (as discussed in Chapter 6) and the quality of interpersonal relations governed by it have been weakened. The situation developed largely when the traditional land

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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The situation developed largely when the traditional land tenure system was modified by Taiwan's Land Reform Program between 1949–1953. An important aspect of the reform was the initiation of a rent reduction and limitation law, but even more important was the introduction of an official contract between landlord and tenant which secured the tenant's rights on the land whatever the relationship, good or bad *kan-ch'ing*, he had with the landlord. The contract for the first time made it clear that the relationship between landlord and tenant and their mutual responsibilities were economic. Once their interaction was limited to an economic relationship as circumscribed by an official contract, it was no longer as important whether either party concerned himself with the traditional maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing*.

Thus, in addition to the already discussed decline of some landlords' socioeconomic and even political interests in the village as a result of the land reform, the deterioration in the basis of *kan-ch'ing*, and with it the prestige of many in the landlord class, has frequently meant that unless landlords who remained in the village had other ways of maintaining their high positions in the community, they lost their usefulness as mediators, being no longer capable of exerting influence and leadership in the community.

On the kinship level, the code which regulated relationships between hierarchal unequals has likewise been affected by change, thus worsening the community's ability to resolve local social conflict. This has occurred on the levels of the *tsu* and even, to some degree, the family. In conflict within the *tsu* or village, as well as beyond the village, the *tsu* organizations through their leaders have always played a role in settling all conflict by mediation. While the several Hsin Hsing *tsu* have never been powerful organizations backed by extremely wealthy members and wealth in corporate land usually necessary to give them extensive local sociopolitical influence, *tsu* authority has recently been further weakened, as we have seen above, by the extension of the villagers' socioeconomic interests beyond the home area. As a result, even the *tsu* have apparently lost much of their ability to exert sanctions against their own members or their opponents. Thus, as a result of the weakening of the social hierarchy, there has developed a more general inability to use the former traditional respect for particular leaders of the landlord class or *tsu* as a force with which to settle disagreements.

It is not purely a matter of the weakening of the traditional hierarchical relationships between people, however, which has diminished the respect for traditional mediators. This has been intensified by the tendency toward a growing equalitarianism on both the social and economic levels of life among the villagers. The tendency was born of greater educational opportunities, increased election of officials, land

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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redistribution, and land contracts, all of which have helped to equalize economic means and social relations. While this has not stopped the peasants from recognizing the former landlords' higher status and power, their willingness to accept them as mediators has clearly diminished, as has this formerly powerful group's interests in such community service.

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The loss of prestige and authority of the traditional mediators, and thus the decline of success of mediation, has also been accompanied by a questioning of a principle aim of mediation—that the goal of the conflict resolution is to enable the people concerned to continue to live harmoniously together.

T [433] [167]

Many local villagers are no longer so strongly wedded to the village as a result of their newly developing relations with the greater market economy and the increased economic opportunities for migration to cities. For example, one consequence is that they are no longer concerned with settling disputes with the idea of solely preserving harmonious relations locally. While this is still very important for many people, it is no longer practically universal.

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Thus, as a result of the greater society's impingement on village life and, at the same time, the villagers' economic need for involvement beyond the village area, the village and even the kinship groups now have difficulty in maintaining themselves as the villagers' source of solidarity and identification. The villagers' response is actively and consciously to reach out beyond the village and even the *tsu*, not particularly for political power as the gentry always did, but primarily for the socioeconomic reinforcement of their security. As the villager is more and more forced to reach beyond the village, the effect is to further weaken his identification with his village and to a lesser extent with his local kinship group, thus necessitating his even further dependency on and need of the outside.

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It appears that such a breakdown of traditional village and kinship relationships has long been going on in much of rural China as a result of some form of urban contacts. Such social change has been accelerated even more markedly in mainland China under the Communists during this last decade and a half. The more extreme breakdown of such traditional village, kinship, and family relationships now apparently taking place on the mainland of China has been attributed to the introduction of communism and its ideological attack on such traditional Chinese concepts as the large family and kinship group. However, taking the situation in Taiwan as an analogy it appears likely that such developments are equally attributable to the urbanization and socioeconomic changes of the twentieth century, speeded up through the methods employed by the Chinese Communists rather

3:Wolf F-5 (1959-1961) 1968 AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Peihotien

sure; and that by his late twenties he was considered an important man. During this time he was no stranger to Peihotien, but he did not enter his father's house as a son. The villagers followed his escapades avidly, particularly his romantic attachments, since the women in his life were many and most were far from respectable. For the village youths and even their sober parents, he came to be pictured as a kind of Chinese Robin Hood.

In describing Lim Hue-lieng's early career, an eminently respectable old farmer told me, "Lim Hue-lieng started out as the leader of all the *lo mua* in this village and then of all the other villages around here. He and the other *lo mua* from here used to fight a lot and they were so famous that even now no one dares to do anything to hurt this village. If someone made a comment about somebody's walking too close to one of our girls, they would fight them right away, or if someone said something in public they would set a time and fight with them later. And if they heard a man was coming to our village to visit a prostitute who lived here, they would wait for him on the path and beat him up. They did all of this to protect the good name of the village.

"They were also famous for 'squeezing the oil' from gamblers and made a lot of money protecting the houses and names of wealthy families in Tapu. Those *lo mua* didn't have to use force. If they wanted money, they just asked someone to loan it to them, and the person didn't dare refuse."

Even the peaceful, quiet men of the village who abhor the kind of life Lim Hue-lieng led are willing to admit that there is still an aura around the name of Peihotien that causes thieves to pass it by. American friends in the well-policed city of Taipei maintained elaborate systems of locks and watchmen, but were robbed repeatedly. We left expensive cameras, typewriters, and watches scattered about our unlocked rooms and never lost so much as a pencil. The petty *lo mua* activities of today's young men are as disapproved by the older and more stable elements of the population as they were thirty years ago, and perhaps with more reason since there seems to be considerably more fighting and far less activity in support of the community and traditional morality. Peihotien's reputation provides the young men of the village with a high status among their peers, but it also demands that they maintain certain standards. They are less able than other youths to ignore a slight or an insult.

648 Moreover, he has little fluency in Taiwanese and since many villagers do not speak Mandarin, he had an especially difficult job communicating. Using another villager as an untrained interpreter presents its own unique problems.

685 [674] The police are in charge of crime when it does occur although crime is fairly rare in the village as compared with the city. Most crimes in the rural area are classified into two types: external, as when an outsider steals material goods, or internal, as when a resident steals near-ripe agricultural products or dried wood. About half the outsiders are caught and dealt with through the courts. Most of the internal thieves are caught but rarely do the cases reach the courts. Instead, they are treated in the same manner that applies to arguments and disputes among fellow residents, i.e., the thief and victim are merely considered to be two disputants.

Mediation and Legal Processes

627 Internal disputes are usually settled internally by a process of mediation. A mediator goes back and forth between disputants listening to the respective stories and repeating them. Eventually, the two sides are brought into each other's presence. If a compromise still can not be reached, they may agree to resort to the temple to have the gods make a settlement.[7]

648 Even outside the village, Taiwan's formal system of civil courts starts with a regular mediation or

648 arbitration board. The arbitration is not binding and may be rejected by either party in the same manner as in the village. In either case, however, pressure is placed on disputants to accept the recommendations of the mediator. The pressure in the formal system is mandatory, i.e., appearance in a regular court if no agreement is reached and in the local system, is due to the prestige of the mediator if he is a local leader or due to the fact the mediator is a policeman. If the latter cannot settle the case informally, someone is going to be arrested, perhaps both disputants.

• 627 Mediation is important for all kinds of local conflict resolution. Mediators are men who are considered wise, reasonable, and respected and therefore, their recommendations are reasonable and only an uncooperative unreasonable man would refuse to accept them. One accepts a recommended compromise or becomes branded as unreasonable and unfair.

It usually takes a while before the mediator makes any suggestion or recommendation. He starts by carrying information back and forth between disputants and is also persuasive for both sides. Elders are usually mediators but qualities other than age are also necessary. Since a mediator must be vigorous, very old men can seldom serve. Mediators should also be reasonably successful and have a reputation for honesty and integrity. Finally,

627 they must be skilled in inter-personal relations and since it takes time to build a reputation which includes all these specifications, particularly the last one, most good mediators are between the ages of 50 and 60.

671 The entire legal process in China, both formal and informal, seems to be more concerned with "reasonableness" and "fairness" than with hard definitions of "right" and "wrong." Decisions do not seem arbitrary and have a high level of predictability.

427 There are a number of kinds of local participation.
686 Special mediation boards are created for special purposes
672 such as dealing with disputes generated out of the various Land Reform Acts. A dispute between an owner and tenant over land illustrates the concept of justice. A villager owned .3 chia of paddy land which he operated primarily with hired labor while practicing a trade. He was drafted into the army and leased the land to another villager with several small children. The lease was up, his service was completed, and he wanted the land back although he was still unmarried and practicing his trade, but the tenant was poor and needed the land. Although technically the owner should have obtained the land, the board, recognizing the needs of the tenant, decided the lease should be extended for three more years. The lease is due to end again next year and there will be another board case because both parties still want the land. Since the owner

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2 chin pork	Birth of Son
2 chin pork*	Marriage of Member
2 chin pork	Death of Father
1 chin pork	Death of Mother
5 chin pork	Death of Member

*Plus attendance fee at wedding

[771] Any member who has a son between meetings brings turtle-dough cakes to the next meeting to distribute as consumption of turtle-dough cakes helps spread good fortune. For any member of a club, those life crises events which usually cost money are supported by fellow members.

561 Another function is religious for worship is always
782 part of the activities of an association meeting. Most
573 units are organized around a particular god with whom the association establishes a special relationship. The host for the next meeting keeps the statue of the association god (which the association usually purchases) between meetings and he is responsible for the required special regular worship activities dedicated to it. The statue stays on the ancestral table in his kung t'ing until after the meeting when it will be carried to the next host's home. Also, the association may participate as a unit sponsoring part of the activities on special religious holidays or may act to refurbish the temple. One big "Fire Purification Ceremony"[1] was originated and sponsored by three cooperating sworn brothers associations.

573 The unit also functions in social control. At
561 times it has disciplined transgressors; association
• 622 members mildly threaten young men who have been too
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573 unfilial or frighten older men with threats of physical
561 violence. The threats have always been sufficient to
627 insure proper behavior. In periods of the year when there
[626] is high probability of stealing such as near New Year's Day, or after a theft has occurred, various associations have taken responsibility for a night patrol in the village. Thieves from outside the li were caught twice in the last three years and were severely thrashed before turning them over to the police. The unit also supports
561 its members in conflict or adversity. Political support
66 for a fellow member is near automatic and it is signifi-
573 cant that most local leaders have connections with the larger kinship units discussed in the last chapter and are also members of fairly large sworn brothers associations. Local political leaders attempt to enlist association support and several usually make courtesy calls long enough for a quick drink and snack at various association meetings.

561 There are few village men who fail to join a
573 sworn brothers association as young men. A few groups have added members later in their existence although most stick to the original membership roster. A migrant to the area may establish good relations and be invited to join an ongoing group whose members are his approximate
[562] age. There are many similar clubs all over the area near Hsin Tien but there is no structural equivalent for women.

462 real support for the many village men who are full time
464 farm laborers or who are partially farm laborers and
476 partially tenants or owner-operators.

Tea Processors

245 There are three tea processing households in
472 Sanlei. One processor owns much land which he operates
• 627 almost totally with hired labor and processes little
[511] more than his own tea. Fifteen years ago he was caught using false weights to buy tea leaves from Sanlei farmers and villagers have never trusted him since. He and his wife are isolated from the rest of the village in social terms and both of their children are living and
[207] working in Taipei. The couple are reasonably well-off financially by village standards and own the second village television set which they watch alone without guests. Just about everyone else in the village watches the television set owned by the village store.

245 The other two processors pay identical prices
472 and offer identical services and share most of the rest of the village tea production except that part
[477] sold to a processor in Erhlei. Although each processor would like a larger share of the business, competition is on the basis of establishing good relations with sellers (farmers) rather than on service or price. One processor is named Liao and had the major share of business in the past. The other is named Chiu.